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Mission-oriented organizations, such as nonprofit organizations and NGOs, rely critically
on volunteer recruitment to achieve their organizational goals. Besides serving as an outlet
of altruistic motives, volunteering often acts as a stepping-stone for a paid position in the
nonprofit sector. This paper provides an explanation for the fact that nonprofit employers are
uniquely able to attract such volunteers with social concerns and career aspirations and for the
related observation that nonprofits figure prominently in mission-related activities. The theory
is predicated on that – by committing to not distributing profits – nonprofit incorporation
relaxes the incentive constraint that employers face when implicitly contracting with volunteers.
The not-for-profit commitment is shown to be effective only in activities where producers, who
can choose to be for-profit or nonprofit, care about the level of the service being provided.
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Volunteering constitutes a considerably large and increasing share of the nonprofit sector’s con-
tribution to economic activity, in most advanced economies.1 Besides volunteering for altruistic
reasons – a desire to help others or contribute to an important cause – there is widespread belief
that volunteering can be a source of professional development by providing work experience and a
chance to develop skills that strengthen employability.2 This is especially true for those pursuing
employment in the nonprofit sector where volunteering experience appears to be a prerequisite for
any type of career. This paper takes the altruistic motivations and the career concerns of volun-
teers as a point of departure and provides an explanation for the following salient patterns (1)
nonprofit organizations attract the overwhelming share of volunteers3 that meet this profile and
(2) volunteer-hiring nonprofits are concentrated in sectors, where the goods and services produced
can be conceived as having a collective good component and which generate nonpecuniary benefits
to those involved in their delivery. Education, healthcare, childcare, international aid, the arts,
religious and philanthropic foundations, and the vast social services are examples of such fields.
These contrast with most other activities, regularly provided by profit taking firms, where intrinsic
motivation is less of a consideration.
The challenge that this paper poses is to explain the above set of observations as an equilibrium
outcome without positing that workers motivated by concerns for social outcomes have an exoge-
nous disposition for working at nonprofit establishments or assuming that nonprofit and for-profit
producers have respective ex ante advantages in the delivery of goods and services of different char-
acter. To this end, I develop a model with two sectors (a mission sector and a non-mission sector),
1For example, in the US the value of volunteer work evaluated at average private wages stood at $283.84 billion
in 2010 (The Nonprofit Almanac 2012). Further evidence of the importance of volunteers for the nonprofit sector is
reported in Salamon et al. (2007), who estimate that volunteers’ effort accounts, on average, for more than a quarter
of the sector’s contribution to GDP.
2This is supported by research that studies factors that determine the decision to supply volunteer time, suggesting
that besides purely altruistic motives people may engage in volunteering activities to improve their employment
opportunities: Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Day and Devlin (1998), Segal and Weisbrod (2002), Gunderson and
Gomez (2003), Handy et al. (2010), Sauer (2012). For instance, Sauer (2012) estimates that the economic returns to
volunteering are relatively more important than non-economic returns for women in the US, while Day and Devlin
(1998) report evidence of a 6-7 percent return of volunteering in annual earnings for Canadian workers. Surveys also
support these findings. For example, the National Survey of Giving, Volunteering, and Participating (2007), which
provides a snapshot of the state of voluntary and civic action in Canada, reveals that almost a quarter (23%) of
volunteers agreed that improving job opportunities was a reason for volunteering, while around half of volunteers
reported that they volunteered to explore their own strengths. See Hall et al. (2009), chart 2.13, pg 35. Moreover,
another survey from the UK suggests that employability is a more frequent motivation for younger individuals (Low
et al., 2007).
3In 1998, the distribution of full-time volunteers by sector in the U.S. was 68.5 percent nonprofit, 26 percent
government and 5.5 percent for-profit sector. See the New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk Reference, Figure 1.7, pg 48.
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where heterogeneous (some mission motivated and some not) managers (principals) and workers
(agents) are matched, choosing organizational form (for-profit, nonprofit), employment contract
and sector. Note that in order to address the previously mentioned challenge the analysis starts
from a position of ex-ante symmetry: (a) the intrinsic benefit that caring managers and workers
derive in the mission sector is attached to the job that they do, not the identity of the organization
(nonprofit or for-profit) in which they do it;4 (b) workers are equally productive working for either
type of employer; and (c) managers have access to a common production technology regardless
of the organizational form they select. Therefore, besides the restriction in the appropriation of
profits there are no ex ante structural differences between for-profit and nonprofit status. I then
proceed to demonstrate how the observed configuration (nonprofit firms hiring volunteers in the
mission sector) arises endogenously in the equilibrium of the model, among the host of ex ante
possible (firm-type/employment structure/sector) combinations.
An important feature of the analysis is that workers’ effort and output are unverifiable by third
parties and as a result performance-contingent remuneration is infeasible;5 this element is present
in both sectors and for all types of firm. One standard solution to this incentive problem is the
use of implicit contracts that are self-enforcing and that take advantage of the long-term aspect of
the employment relationship: a worker receives a fixed payment that exceeds opportunity costs as
long as performance has been satisfactory and is dismissed otherwise. This type of compensation,
namely a wage set above the market clearing rate (efficiency wage), is known to induce important
labor market inefficiencies – sub-optimal employment levels. Here, motivated by the observation
that some workers (interns and volunteers) are induced to undertake unpaid or very low pay work
by the possibility of rewards in the form of future employment by the same or some other employer,
I argue that this two-tier employment structure provides a more efficient solution to the problem of
incomplete employment contracts: it allows firms to extract some of the rents that workers have to
be offered later on as paid workers in order to supply effort, thus dampening the distorting effect
arising from providing incentives with payments above opportunity cost.6
I consider two alternative incentive structures, which in the interest of facilitating exposition I
refer to as:
4This is not to deny that individuals might receive direct benefits from founding or working for a nonprofit firm.
Here we wish to explore whether we can explain the observed patterns of nonprofit activity without assuming such
direct rewards.
5The notion that workers’ performance cannot be verified in court is borrowed from the incomplete contracts
literature and has been widely applied to agency models of employment, see Malcomson (1999).
6The possibility that employers use deferred payments as a means of providing incentives has been studied, in a
different context, by Lazear (1981) and by Akerlof and Katz (1989).
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– Volunteering : A worker is hired as an unpaid volunteer and is subsequently transferred to a paid
position not necessarily at the firm where he has volunteered (incentives are sector-wide).
– Internship: A worker is hired as an unpaid intern and is subsequently promoted within the firm
he has interned, when a vacancy is created (incentives are firm-specific).
The key difference between volunteering and internship is that time spent volunteering elsewhere
is treated “as if” it were volunteered at the firm – much like actual volunteering occurs in reality –
whereas interns are promoted at the firm where they intern. In both structures a worker is willing
to work for a period with no pay if he anticipates that he will be subsequently promoted to a wage
position, yielding an expected lifetime utility no less than his outside option. But notice that the
hiring of volunteers (or interns) introduces a commitment problem on the side of the employer,
as firms have incentive to recruit unpaid workers, promising them promotion to paid positions,
and then renege on the promise. It is well known from the theory of repeated games that repeated
interaction can help overcome these problems. The dynamic interaction between multiple firms and
workers is formally studied as a repeated game and a characterization of the equilibrium strategies
supporting ‘volunteering’ and the ‘internship’ structure is provided.
An additional component of the present setting is that managers and workers can be intrinsically
motivated and derive nonpecuniary benefits from contributing to the production of mission goods
(e.g. nurses, teachers, aid workers). Motivated agents are typically heterogeneous in terms of
mission preferences – what activity to pursue and how to pursue it – and usually some hands-on
experience is required before an individual can learn enough about the different causes to be able
to identify a preferred mission. For example, the manager of an international aid agency or an
aid worker may prefer working for an organization with a particular religious outlook, or they may
develop through experience a preference over the targeted group of beneficiaries (which group is
more needy). Because the main parties involved may have different views about how the project
should be carried out, preference alignment is an important determinant of the quantity of the
mission good.7
Volunteering facilitates the matching of like-minded organizations and workers, which improves
the impact of the mission activity as well-matched pairs are more productive: a volunteer works
7The role of matching in principal-agent pairs with heterogeneous preferences is explored in Besley and Ghatak
(2005), who show that better matching leads to higher effort and productivity. Here we take as given the proposition
that better matched pairs are more productive in order to focus on how the interaction between the choice of
organizational form (for profit or nonprofit) and incentive structure (volunteering or internship) can lead to more
efficient matching.
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for a period of ‘exploration’, then as his mission preferences become known he can transfer to a
matching firm, when a vacancy is created.8 By contrast, internships match workers and organiza-
tions randomly, as when an intern joins the firm his mission preferences have not been determined.
Therefore, from employers’ perspective volunteer hiring is the preferred hiring practice in the mis-
sion sector because it can generate more efficient matching.
Nothing in the structure of the model sketched so far suggests that a rational manager would
choose nonprofit over for-profit status, since the only effect of this choice is that the manager’s
pecuniary payoff from operating the firm is reduced. A possible reason would be that nonprofits
are at an advantage in terms of being able to sustain volunteer hiring. But does the nonprofit
incorporation relax the incentive compatibility constraint that makes commitment to hiring vol-
unteers credible? The key insight of this paper is that the answer to this hinges on the type of
activity (mission-oriented or not) that is undertaken. In particular, if volunteering only raises prof-
its (true by construction in the non-mission sector) then a nonprofit firm does not have a particular
advantage over for-profit firms. This is because while for a nonprofit manager the benefit from
cheating is weaker – under nonprofit status profits are less valuable for managers because they can
only be enjoyed as perks – so is the reward for honest behavior. Therefore, in this case a nonprofit
manager’s promise of honest behavior is not more credible than the one of a for-profit manager.
On the other hand, if volunteering also enhances the quantity of the service provided – because
of better matching – and managers care about quantity, then nonprofit status is helpful in solving
employers’ moral hazard problem (true in the mission sector). The intuition is that a nonprofit
manager will discount more heavily the fact that if she cheats on volunteers quantity will suffer
and hence a smaller profit (reputational rent) is needed to maintain incentive compatibility.
Thus, the model accounts for the observed patterns of entry by sector: nonprofits engage
in the provision of goods and services where better matching on mission preferences improves
quantity, while in sectors where missions play no role, nonprofit incorporation is not essential and
for-profit status will be preferred. In addition, the analysis explains why otherwise similar nonprofit
and for-profit organizations will select different incentive structures to motivate their workers. In
equilibrium, nonprofit organizations select the volunteering organizational structure while for-profit
organizations utilize the internship. These features are in tune with the patterns of employment
structure, work force characteristics and firm-type entry across sectors that we observe in many
modern economies.
8Johnson (1978) and Jovanovic (1979) develop models of job shopping and matching.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature
in greater detail. Section 3 introduces the environment of the model; section 4 characterizes the
two types of relational employment contract, while section 5 analyzes the choice of organizational
form and employment relational contract in each sector. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature that has identified circumstances where nonprofit status
may be a valuable commitment against opportunistic behavior that arises because of various forms
of contractual incompleteness. For instance, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) argue that nonprofit
incorporation is a valuable mechanism for an entrepreneur because, by weakening incentives to
maximize profits, it credibly commits to customers that non-contractible quality will be higher,
while in Rowat and Seabright (2006), nonprofit status is a valuable signal for aid agencies because
it reassures donors that their funds will be indeed directed to unverifiable development projects
and not be skimmed off. Francois (2000, 2003) establishes conditions under which a nonprofit
manager, by relinquishing residual claims to profits, faces weaker incentives to adjust production
after a worker has shirked. When workers care about the level of the public good produced this
commitment is shown to be valuable in that it reduces the wage that has to be offered to induce
workers’ non-contractible effort. Ghatak and Mueller (2011) incorporate the above interaction
between the manager and the worker into a labor market setting in order to study how labor
market conditions affect organizational choice. None of these papers consider the issue of whether
the nonprofit commitment helps sustain volunteer hiring and sorting which is the main focus here.
Several recent papers study the provision of incentives and the screening of intrinsically mo-
tivated workers, among others Handy and Katz (1998), Murdock (2002), Glazer (2004), Francois
(2007), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008), Prendergast (2007).9 This paper builds on the contri-
bution by Besley and Ghatak (2005), who study incentive design issues in an environment with
mission-motivated principals and agents. Their emphasis is on the role of matching of principals
and agents on mission preferences and the effects of competition on productivity and the power
of incentives, but they abstract from issues concerning organizational form which are central here.
Specifically, the contribution of the present paper is that it presents a plausible avenue (volunteer
hiring and sorting) which interacting with the endogenously chosen organizational status allows
9See Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a survey of this literature.
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mission-driven entrepreneurs to match with like-minded workers and therefore play the efficiency
enhancing role emphasized by Besley and Ghatak (2005).
The analysis of the relational contract between managers and workers follows the literature on
efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), and the more recent formalization of such arrange-
ments as self-enforcing implicit contracts. Specifically, MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) (under
symmetric information) and Levin (2003) (under adverse selection and moral hazard) have shown,
in a repeated game framework, the existence of an equilibrium outcome where firms can use implicit
self-enforcing contracts to motivate workers, provided there is sufficient rent for both parties from
the continuation of employment.10 Optimal self-enforcing contracts can take the form of efficiency
wages or performance bonuses depending on market conditions. In particular, MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1998) have shown that efficiency wages are likely to arise in markets where there is excess




I consider an economy with discrete time and infinite time horizon consisting of two sectors: a
mission-oriented and a non-mission-oriented sector, denoted by m and n respectively. Two groups of
agents exist in the economy: managers and workers.11 There is heterogeneity in mission preferences
in both groups. Specifically, I consider three types of workers, indexed by i, and managers, indexed
by j, with i, j ∈ {u, m1, m2}. Type u managers and workers are motivated exclusively by monetary
rewards. I refer to type u agents as unmotivated. Types m1 and m2 are referred to as mission-
motivated in light of the fact that, besides the usual pecuniary motivations, they are driven by a
concern about the missions pursued by the organizations they join. I allow for a distinction between
m1and m2 which has one of two possible interpretations. It can either reflect the differences in
focus among the variety of subfields of public good activity (e.g. advocacy/activist versus direct
care provider), or it can reflect differences in some attribute (e.g. religious affiliation versus secular)
within some specific subfield (e.g. education) of the mission sector.
10Dur and Tichem (2013) studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive con-
tracts.
11For clarity, we shall refer to managers using feminine pronouns and to workers using masculine.
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3.2 Production
There are three goods in the model: two produced goods gm and gn, corresponding to the mission
and the non-mission sector respectively, and a non-produced numeraire good y. Production of
gm and gn is undertaken by organizations – established as either for-profit or nonprofit – which
consist of a manager employing two workers. Details about the differences between the two types
of institutions are provided further on. Workers do not care directly about the type of organization
they work for and are equally productive working for either type of provider. All organizations
in each sector, have access to a common sector-specific production technology, gs(e1, e2), where
s ∈ {m, n} and ei ∈ {el, eh}, which describes how the combined effort choices of the two workers
and the entrepreneurial input of the manager translate into the production of the organization’s
service, gm or gn. I assume that each worker can choose between two effort levels: high effort
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In the mission sector, if, in addition to high effort, workers’ type matches the type of the
organization I assume that preference congruence has a beneficial impact on productivity and
hence provision of gm is increased to ĝm > g
h
m.
12 To be concrete, imagine that there are two sets of
actions that workers can take: one set is costly to them to provide, and shirking on this dimension
will eventually be detected by the manager of the organization. These actions, denoted by (e) in
the model, are responsible for the organization delivering ghm when effort is high. In addition, there
is another unobservable set of actions, not explicitly modeled, that workers will only undertake if
they buy into the mission of the organization. It is this set of actions that account for the higher
level of mission good provision, ĝm, that the organization can achieve with better matching.
13
3.3 Workers
In order to focus on incentive issues I assume that workers are risk neutral and have a within
period utility function, separable in income (y) and effort (e). The per-period utility, UWij (y, θij , e),
12In reality, the difference between ghm and ĝm would most likely correspond to differences in the quality of the
service being produced. The model is consistent with this view, if we interpret output as being weighted by quality.
13The logic is similar to that in Akerlof and Kranton (2005), who emphasize the notion of workers’ identity and
argue that when workers identify with the goals of the organizations they are employed they might be willing to put
in high effort with little wage variation. Here I take the view that workers’ sense of identity stems from the particular
mission the organization is committed to.
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attained by worker of type i when working for employer of type j is:
UWij (y, θij , e) =

y − e if i = u and j = u
y + θl − e if i ∈ {m1,m2}, j ∈ {m1,m2}, i 6= j
y + θh − e if i ∈ {m1,m2}, j ∈ {m1,m2}, i = j
where θh > θl > 0 (1)
The parameter θij represents the intrinsic payoff of a mission-motivated worker, which accrues to
the worker independently of the legal status of the organization (for-profit or nonprofit). If employed
by one of the organizations, a worker receives an endogenous wage w, while if not employed workers
are able to find work elsewhere at an exogenously given reservation wage
−
w, which does not require




2) − 2eh > 2
−
w, where ps is the
market price for good gs, so it is productively efficient for workers to be employed by a firm and to
choose high effort.
3.4 Managers
Unmotivated managers, type u, care only about personal consumption of the numeraire good y. On
the other hand, mission-motivated managers have preferences given by uMj (y, gm), for j ∈ {m1,m2}.
That is, I allow mission-motivated managers, as I did above with mission-motivated workers, to
derive personal nonpecuniary benefits from being involved in the delivery of collective goods. As
in the case of workers, intrinsic motivations are present whether the manager sets up a nonprofit
or a for-profit organization. Furthermore, I assume that the manager’s type and the organization’s
form are common knowledge and so is the worker’s type – whether he is mission-motivated or
not; however, if he is, his precise mission type (m1 or m2) is revealed to him and becomes public
information only after working for one period.
Before entering a sector, a manager can choose whether to establish the organization as for-profit
or nonprofit. Thus, a brief description of the differences between the two organizational forms is in
order. The objective of the manager (residual claimant) of a for-profit firm is primarily to maximize
profits (pi) for the organization. This assumption is standard in neoclassical economic analysis and
does not warrant further justification. On the other hand, when an organization is nonprofit,
it is not obvious what the objective of its manager is. Nevertheless, a defining characteristic
of nonprofits is that they are subject to a nondistribution constraint, which stipulates that the
manager of a nonprofit is banned from appropriating any net earnings from the organization’s
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operations.14 I follow Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) in assuming that the effect of this is that a
fraction of the firm’s profits can indirectly accrue to her in the form of perquisites such as fewer
work hours, better working conditions etc.15 This way of modeling the objectives of nonprofit
managers makes operational the notion that these organizations can be instituted to have weaker
incentives to pursue profits. Though it is true that for-profit firms may also be motivated to serve
other goals, I maintain that they must be consistent with their primary responsibility which is to
generate sufficient rewards to shareholders. Thus, I take the view that, as a first approximation,
for-profit managers will face more high-powered incentives to maximize total firm value than their
nonprofit counterparts. In keeping with this discussion, I assume that the decision making process
within nonprofit organizations – represented by the actions of the manager (founder) in my analysis
– balances the goals of maximizing profits and furthering the mission of the organization. I posit
that the outcome of this can be represented by an induced per-period quasi-linear utility function
for a manager of type j who chooses organizational form k, where k = fp denotes a for-profit
organization and k = np indicates a nonprofit organization, given by:
vkj (pi, gs) = φ
k
jpi + γjsb(gs) (2)
where pi stands for profits and b(.) is a strictly increasing and concave function. The binary vari-
able γjs ∈ {0, 1} captures managers’ “care intensity”, which is only present for mission-motivated
managers when producing a mission-oriented good. The parameter φkj ∈ [0, 1] reflects the extent to
which the organization’s profits can be enjoyed as income by the manager – so the nondistribution




Note that when production is of the good without the mission component gn, then γjn = 0, so
setting up a nonprofit firm in the non-mission sector only corresponds with reducing the utility a
manager obtains from profit. Equation (2) captures, in a reduced-form, the fundamental trade-off
that the manager faces in making the incorporating decision, highlighted by Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001): commitment to nonprofit status signals greater care for the ‘quality’ of the public good,
which, however, comes at the cost of restricted access to pecuniary rewards.
14It is important to note that such a constraint does not preclude the possibility that a nonprofit organization may
be actually earning positive profits.
15In addition to the nondistribution constraint, nonprofit organizations do not have access to the equity capital
market and may be also subject to regulations requiring that they engage in specific charitable, religious, educational
or scientific activities in order to receive preferential tax treatment. We abstract from these issues here.
16For simplicity, I make no distinction between the owner and the manager of the firm, so that agency problems
between ownership and control are assumed away.
10
4 The Employment Relational Contracts
An important feature of the environment is that though the individual performance of the worker
can be potentially assessed by the manager or supervisor, it is unverifiable by third parties, and as
a result, no standard contractual instruments can be used to induce workers’ effort.17 I abstract
from the underlying details regarding the incentive provision problem and simply assume that
workers’ input and the intrinsic reward they receive, though potentially observable by the firm and
the agent, are noncontractible. When an employer and a worker are engaged in a repeated, on-
going relationship, they may be able to sustain informal long-term relational contracts as a means
to overcome the noncontractibility of worker’s performance. In what follows I characterize the
nature of the internship and volunteering relational contract between an exogenously given single
manager-worker pair.
The two alternative relational contracts that are considered here are (a) The internship con-
tract, which entails the vertical promotion of interns within an organization. Under this incentive
structure, workers and managers are randomly matched. (b) The volunteering contract, which
involves the horizontal sorting of workers to managers with similar mission preferences, after the
unpaid stage. In the mission sector, this incentive structure will be shown to generate assortative
matching of manager-worker pairs. Both sorts of self-enforcing contracts give rise to actions that
could not be supported in a one-shot interaction, but which can be sustained when agents have a
sufficiently high valuation of the future.
To generate exogenous job separations I assume that workers remain alive for another period
with probability β ∈ (0, 1), while with the complementary probability, (1 − β), they die and are
replaced by identical workers.18
In the present model, a worker faces the following career choices: what sector to seek employment
(m or n), what type of employer (u, m1, m2) to be matched with and how much effort to exert (e
h
or el). To fix ideas, I describe briefly the successive stages in the career path of a typical worker
who will enter into an implicit contract with a manager in a certain sector, assuming that such
contracts exist in equilibrium, abstracting momentarily from issues of sector selection and matching
17For example, an aid worker’s job description typically involves a variety of complex tasks: from direct care
provision to drafting reports, fund-raising and lobbying. Performance related compensation in this context is rare
because (a) The monitoring and measurement of a worker’s contribution to these tasks is very costly (and certainly
difficult to verify by a third party, such as the courts) or (b) it may be difficult to ascertain an individual worker’s
contribution (due to the team character of production) or (c) it may induce effort distortions (due to multi-tasking
considerations).
18For convenience, I subsume the discounting factor of agents in β.
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which are considered subsequently. The given worker moves sequentially through three states: the
general pool of workers, unpaid employment and paid employment (i.e. deferred wage position). In
particular, the worker is born into the general pool where he receives an exogenous compensation
−
w every period. At the end of each period there is an endogenous probability ρ that the worker
will exit the general pool and will find an unpaid employment position. Suppose that this occurs
in period t− 1; then the worker works for no pay during period t and at the end of the period he
transitions to a wage position with probability (1− β), which is the probability that the currently
paid worker dies; otherwise, he remains an unpaid worker for another period.19 If the worker is
hired into a paid position he continues to work there until he dies.
I model the self-enforcing contracts as equilibrium strategies of a dynamic game between man-
agers and workers. The first step of the analysis is to specify precisely the incomplete contract
environment in which the repeated game is conducted.
4.1 Information Structure and Within Period Timing
The information structure of the repeated game between workers and organizations, at any time t,
can be summarized as follows:20
Public Information. The identity of all previous employment pairs and the wage payment
histories are common knowledge. In particular, all workers and managers know whether a separation
has occurred but do not know whether the worker quit or was fired. A separation that has taken
place because of a death of one of the parties is distinguishable from separations due to the other
causes involving one of the parties violating a promise. Also, if a separation occurs because a
volunteer transfers to a paid position with a different employer this is also distinguishable from
a separation due to malfeasance.21 Note that a manager’s public history includes the event of
mistreatment of volunteers. By this I refer to the event where an organization which has been hiring
volunteers into unpaid positions refuses to reciprocate by promoting workers from the volunteering
pool into its own paid work vacancies. I assume that such practice becomes public information.22
19At this point the employer must decide whether to honour the promise to promote the worker or cheat by hiring
another intern to fill the vacancy. I examine the conditions that ensure employers’ incentive compatible behavior in
the next section.
20For a similar treatment of the information structure in a dynamic game between workers and firms, see MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989).
21For example, a letter of confirmation/recommendation from the employer outlining a volunteer’s experience may
be provided at the end of the assignment.
22When an organization cheats on the promise to promote a volunteer into its paid position, it hires instead an
unpaid intern directly from the general pool and therefore ceases to employ a paid worker. I assume that this
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Worker’s Private Information. A worker knows his own performance and whether the organi-
zation where he was employed in previous periods honoured any promises made to him.
Manager’s Private Information. A manager knows the history of effort contributions of all her
workers up to time t (imperfectly) and whether she has delivered on promises made to her workers.
The sequencing of decisions within a period in the contracting game between a matched manager
and worker is:
• The manager makes the hiring decision (if there is a vacancy).
• The manager decides whether to make a payment or not.
• The worker makes the effort decision.
• The manager observes imperfectly worker’s effort contribution.
• The worker observes manager’s hiring decision.
• Both parties decide whether to continue the employment relationship or not.
• The period ends and both players continue to the next period with probability β.

















Figure 1: Timing of Events
4.2 The ‘Internship’ Incentive Compatible Wage
I now focus on the determination of the incentive compatible wage that induces an intern’s effort.
I consider a stationary environment, with employers offering the same wage wI every period and
practice can be detected by labour market participants by observing the composition of the organization’s workforce.
Essentially what I assume is that whether the organization is employing paid workers or not is public information,
which is verifiable information since wage payments are verifiable.
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the expected utility a worker gains from remaining in the general pool being constant. Letting
V Iijt represent the expected lifetime utility of a worker of type i who accepts an unpaid position
(internship) at an organization of type j at time t, and suppressing the time subscripts I write:
V Iij = −eh + β
[
(1− β)V pij + βV Iij
]
. (3)
In this expression, (1 − β) denotes the probability that there will be a paid position vacancy and
thus that the intern will be hired into a paid job. V pij designates the expected lifetime utility of a
paid worker who decides to deliver high effort. An intern receives no compensation and provides
high effort in the current period but expects to be hired into a paid job with probability (1 − β).
Thus, (1− β) acts as a quasi-discount factor on the value of becoming a paid worker.
Similarly, V pij is defined below:
V pij = w
I + θij − eh + βmax(V pij , V sij) (4)
where V sij represents the expected utility of a worker who decides to shirk. If a worker supplies high
effort then he attains utility wI + θij − eh during the course of the current period, where wI is the
wage associated with the position in an organization of type j and θij is the intrinsic reward for
individual of type i associated with a position in an organization of type j. If the job is continued,
then the worker decides whether to furnish high effort next period or not, if doing so yields greater
utility to him than shirking.
When a worker shirks, he receives the wage wI and the nonpecuniary benefit θij but does not
undergo the disutility of supplying effort. A shirking worker is detected with a constant exogenous
probability µ ∈ (0, 1), in which case he loses the job at the end of the period, and goes undetected
with probability (1−µ) in which case he makes the effort decision again next period.23 I write the
value function of a shirker as:
V sij = w
I + θij + β
[
µV g + (1− µ) max(V pij , V sij)
]
. (5)
23The assumption of a less than perfect monitoring technology can be justified by the costs associated with su-
pervision. In addition, I assume that inference of effort via observing output is impossible because of noise and the
difficulties of identifying individual contributions due to the team character of production.
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w is the general pool compensation and ρ is the probability of moving out of the unemploy-
ment state.
Let us now consider the incentives that employers face in designing the relational contract.
Their strategy is to minimize labor costs subject to being able to attract interns and induce them
to provide high effort. Consequently, they will choose wI such that the prospective worker is
no worse-off from becoming an intern and not remaining in the general pool, i.e. the following
participation constraint must be satisfied:
V Iij ≥ V g. (PC)
If V Iij > V
g, then it is in the firm’s best interest to adjust the features of the package and transfer
the surplus from the worker to itself such that internships are no more attractive than the outside
option. The only means of adjusting the package, since the probability of transitioning from unpaid
to paid work (1 − β) is exogenous, is to reduce the wage associated with a paid position. Let the







where θr is the expected intrinsic payoff when workers and firms are randomly matched. (θl < θr <
θh). Also, to deter shirking by the worker, the wage offered to the worker must satisfy the following
incentive compatibility (no-shirking) constraint:
V pij ≥ V sij . (8)
This condition implies:





the relational contract (wI , eh) between an intern/worker and a firm consists of a wage satisfying:
wI(ρ) =
(
1− β2) (1 + βρ− β (1− µ))




(1 + βρ− β2)
−





Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.







is needed to ensure that the wage in
(ICI) is at least as high as the wage in (7), which is necessary to induce participation by workers in
the general pool. The incentive compatible wage in (ICI) admits a standard efficiency wage type
of interpretation. That is, to induce effort the organization has to pay the worker a premium over
his market alternative. Intuitively, the relational contract defined above allows the organization to
elicit effort from the worker while limiting the rent offered to him. This is accomplished because
while the worker gets a wage premium while occupying an efficiency wage position, the rent is
partially taxed back by making the worker pay an “entrance fee” in the form of the uncompensated
effort he has to supply as an intern.24 This arrangement encourages interns to stay with the firm
and supply high effort throughout their career in order to benefit from the higher wages that come
with seniority.
For the relational contract in (ICI) to be supported in equilibrium, a sufficient rent has to
be generated from employment. The rent is the difference between the returns to the current
arrangement and those that the two parties could achieve in their outside options. In this model,
the surplus is divided between employers and workers. To see this note that an intern prefers his
current status than staying in the outside pool (V Iij ≥ V g). For employers, profits from hiring
interns are trivially greater than profits from hiring straight from the outside pool, which would
be the alternative way of filling a vacancy, because an intern generates as much lifetime expected
profits as an outside worker when in a paid position, but also makes an uncompensated contribution
to the firm’s profits as an intern.
Note that I have ruled out the possibility that workers can post a performance bond (in the form
of a negative hiring wage) during the internship stage of employment. If this were possible, then
firms could use this instrument to bind the participation constraint of workers (V Iij = V
g), thereby
extracting the entire surplus from the employment relationship and clearing the labor market. In
reality, however, performance bonds are rarely observed. One possible explanation for this absence
is credit market imperfections that make it impossible for workers to raise the money for the bond.
More generally, the possibility of posting performance bonds raises a host of issues, as it induces
24Essentially, our version of the shirking model allows an entrance fee to emerge which reduces the rent that the
employer needs to concede in order to motivate the worker. The suppression of this mechanism in the original Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) formulation–by assuming that the principal pays the same wage at every period–was considered
a theoretical weakness of the efficiency wage theory (see Carmichael 1989).
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employers to cheat workers in various ways, so I proceed by assuming that firms leave some rents
to workers.
4.3 The ‘Volunteering’ Incentive Compatible Wage
The volunteering employment structure resembles the internship structure except that volunteering
is an implicit contract offered jointly by all participating organizations and not by one specific
employer. In particular, the volunteer is initially randomly matched with an organization and
supplies high effort for that employer with no compensation; subsequently, the volunteer learns his
type and when a paid position in an organization of the same type is vacated he transitions to that
position even if this means transferring to a different organization. I examine managers’ incentives
to sustain this structure in the next subsection.
In addition to providing incentives, since volunteering is recognized by other firms, it plays
the role of facilitating matching between mission-motivated workers and organizations.25 I posit
a frictionless matching process: the matching is instantaneous and costless. I look for allocations
of workers to organizations that are voluntary and stable, in the sense that there is no pair that
could negotiate an agreement that would make both parties better off than they are in their current
matches. The following lemma characterizes the nature of stable matching in the mission sector.
Lemma 2 Any stable matching equilibrium must have organizations and workers assortatively
matched.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
I now turn to the determination of the incentive compatible wage for an organization hiring
volunteers. The value functions of being in any of the three possible states, employed and paid,
employed and unpaid (volunteer) and unemployed are identical to the ones in (3), (6), (4) and (5).
Therefore, maintaining the notation I established in the previous section, incentive compatible
wages that support assortative matching have to satisfy the following two conditions:
V pij ≥ V sij (9)
and
wVii + θ
h ≥ wVij + θr (10)
25In equilibrium, volunteering only occurs in the mission sector, this will be proved later, but for now we take it as
given.
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The first condition is standard and ensures that the worker supplies high effort. The second
condition ensures that the payoff to a worker when working for an organization of the same type
is at least as high as when working for an organization of a different type.




1− β2) (1 + βρ− β (1− µ))




(1 + βρ− β2)
−




Proof. Proof is in Appendix B.
The interpretation of the incentive compatibility wage for volunteering is analogous to that
offered above for internship. The analysis of the two alternative self-enforcing mechanisms can be
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Conditional on a common job acquisition rate (ρ), binding incentive compatible
wages in the mission sector are higher under an ‘Internship’ relational contract than a ‘Volunteering’
relational contract (wI(ρ) > wV (ρ)).
Proof. Follows directly from (ICI), (ICV ) and noting that θh > θr.
As in Besley and Ghatak (2005), selecting workers with congruent preferences can be cost saving
for organizations, as this allows them to induce high effort at a lower wage. In addition, there are
productivity gains to be made since volunteering ensures the better matching which raises workers’
output. Consequently, those firms that can attract volunteers will be at an advantage. This feature
is absent in the non-care sectors of the economy, so for employers a volunteering contract in those
sectors is not preferred to the internship contract discussed above.
The workings of the matching process I envisage between mission-motivated principals and
agents resemble that of the entry-level medical labor market. There it was recognized that mis-
matches occurred because competition led hospitals to sign up medical students early on, years
ahead of graduation, before their skills and interests were developed.26 I believe that the process
of volunteer hiring described above alleviates a similar problem – albeit in a less structured fashion
26The problem was that when a hospital and a student reached an early deal they did not take into account the
externality imposed on other hospitals and interns (Roth 1984). Some rules were eventually designed to move the
dates of appointment later into the senior year of medical school when more information about students’ abilities and
preferences was available and as a result more efficient matches between interns and hospitals were identified.
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than the labor market for medical residents – that would arise if mission-oriented organizations
hired workers too soon (as would be the case with internships), before their mission preferences
have been revealed.
It now remains to establish that the wages and employment patterns which have been computed
for a single worker can constitute an equilibrium of the multi-player game.
5 Selection of Relational Contract and Organizational Form
5.1 Non-mission Sector
In the non-mission sector mission matching plays no role. It follows that in the non-mission sector
managers will find it optimal to set up for-profit firms since the for-profit status makes them full
residual claimants of the organization’s net earnings. This feature of the model is also consistent
with the observation that nonprofit firms are absent from sectors of the economy which do not
involve mission-oriented production.
Furthermore, since there is no issue of matching managers and workers in this sector internships
is the preferable hiring policy. However, when an internship structure is implemented there is still
scope for opportunistic behavior on the part of managers. In particular, when a paid position va-
cancy is created in an organization which has been hiring interns then its manager has an incentive
not to honour the promise to hire the existing intern into the paid position, but to fill the posi-
tion with an unpaid worker from the general pool. Such behavior once detected by labor market
participants results in loss of reputation and is punished in future labor market interactions by the
workers’ equilibrium strategies. That is, in future periods workers will not be willing to be recruited
as unpaid interns and the manager would have to resort to paying both of its workers an up-front
wage wI satisfying (ICI). Equilibrium strategies supporting the internship hiring structure are
defined in Appendix A.
The incentive compatibility condition of the manager may be written as follows:
1
1− δ v






I ≥ piId + δ
1− δpi
e (11)
where piI , piId and pie denote per-period profits under an internship structure, the deviation, and
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in the periods after the deviation respectively, and piId > piI > pie. For future reference, it is useful
to rewrite (11) as:
piI ≥ (1− δ)piId + δpie ≡ K (12)
This incentive constraint must be satisfied for the internship structure to be a credible recruitment
strategy. With free entry into the non-mission sector, the level of profits that a manager can enjoy
in equilibrium will satisfy (12) as equality. Notice that adding heterogeneity among unmotivated
agents would not lead to the implication that there is a nonprofit advantage in the non-mission
sector as well because of the absence of the non-pecuniary component in managers’ payoff.
5.2 Mission Sector
The purpose of this sub-section is to explore the role of the interaction between the choice of
organizational form and the presence of mission preferences for the type of implicit contract that
managers will use, in equilibrium, to overcome the non-contractibility problem of workers’ effort.
In what follows, I analyze whether it is incentive compatible for managers to implement volunteer
hiring. In particular, I shall show that under the stated assumptions on the preferences of the
managers who control the organizations, a deviation from a volunteer structure is more valuable
for for-profit firms, which in equilibrium is going to lead to volunteering being only available to
nonprofit organizations.
For an organization that implements a volunteer hiring structure the composition of its work-
force, at any time t, is one wage worker plus one volunteer who awaits promotion to a paid position
next period and is going to be replaced by a new volunteer. Profits equal piV = pmĝm− wV , where
pm is the price of the final product which the firm takes as given. Similarly, for an organization
which uses an internship structure, its workforce consists of one wage worker plus one intern who
will be promoted if a wage position is vacated next period and will be replaced by a new intern.
Profits equal piI = pmg
h
m−wI , where ĝm > ghm, reflecting the fact that interns are randomly matched
with organizations.
Note that the volunteer relational contract described above creates a commitment problem on
the part of the employer. Organizations have an incentive not to promote current volunteers to
wage positions and to replace them with new volunteers from the general pool, thus appropriating
the unpaid labor contribution made by volunteers. Workers anticipating that they will not receive
the high future payments have no incentive to work and thus incentives are destroyed. Thus, for
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volunteer hiring to be sustainable it has to satisfy the manager’s incentive compatibility condition.
Consider what constitutes a deviation from the volunteering structure. Suppose that a paid
position vacancy is created. The organization deviates by reneging on the promise to hire an
individual from the volunteering pool to fill its vacancy and instead hires an unpaid intern straight
from the general pool to fill this position. By doing this, the manager makes a one-period gain from
not having to pay the wage she would otherwise have to, if she continued to hire volunteers to paid
positions, but has to resort to an internship structure to get around workers’ moral hazard in future
periods since workers will refuse to volunteer for her anymore. That is, organizations that cheat
lose their reputations and are punished in future labor market dealings by the workers’ equilibrium
strategies. Punishment here consists of future workers refusing to volunteer for organizations who
have previously chosen not to promote volunteers into paid positions and to instead only accept
internship contracts from such organizations.27 This kind of grim trigger strategy requires that
labor market participants can observe whether an organization is employing a paid worker or not.
In particular, when a manager breaches the implicit agreement to promote a volunteer into a
paid position and hires another unpaid worker then during the deviation she employs only unpaid
workers; other potential workers can detect this – because wage payments are verifiable information
– and so they rationally avoid volunteering for the organization in the future. Equilibrium strategies
supporting the volunteer-hiring relational contract are explicitly defined in Appendix A.
Specifically, in the first period of deviation the manager hires two interns to fill both the vacant
paid position and the unpaid position. Profits are piV d = pmg
h
m. The opportunistic manager
then loses the goodwill of being an honest employer so in future periods workers only accept
internship positions that are more costly for the firm because wI > wV – that is, the wage paid to
interns is greater than the wage paid to volunteers. Also the mismatch induced because interns are
randomly matched with organizations will also have an impact on the ability of the organization
to successfully fulfill its mission. That is, following a deviation, the organization’s mission good
production is compromised (ghm).
Hence, volunteering is self-enforcing if the present value of honouring is greater than the present
27Given this strategy of workers, the best response for managers who have reneged in the past is to continue
cheating on the promise to promote volunteers, so that workers’ strategies are a best response.
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I , ghm) (13)
for each j ∈ {m1,m2}, and k ∈ {f, n}
where piV d > piV > piI and the last inequality follows from the fact that wI ≥ wV . The left-hand
side of (13) is a manager’s discounted payoff from not cheating. The first term on the right-hand
side of (13) represents the utility the manager can attain if she cheats. Note that this would raise
profits but hurt the quantity of the mission good.28 The second term captures the expected present
value payoff from hiring interns, which is the hiring practice the manager implements along the
punishment path. My goal now is to determine for which organizational form incentive compatibility
















which upon rearrangement and simplification implies that:






Define the right-hand side of (ICM) as Θ(φk). The following result holds:
Proposition 2 In the mission sector, equilibrium level profits required to satisfy incentive compat-
ibility of managers under a for-profit status is higher than that under a nonprofit status.
Proof. Because Θ(φk) is increasing in φk, and φfp > φnp it follows that Θ(φfp) > Θ(φnp).
To gain some intuition for this result notice that the way in which the reputation mechanism
informally enforces managers’ incentive compatible behavior is by offering to the potential cheater a
“premium”: a stream of payoffs that exceed the potential gain from cheating. This premium is given
in both monetary (i.e. higher profits) and intrinsic (i.e. more quantity) terms. Under nonprofit
status profits are less valuable for a manager – because they can only be enjoyed as perks – so a
nonprofit manager places relatively more weight on the fact that if she cheats on volunteers quantity
will suffer, and hence a smaller monetary premium is needed to maintain incentive compatibility.
28Note that for cheating to be worthwhile it has to be that φk
(
piV d − piV ) ≥ b(ĝm)− b(ghm). That is, the monetary
benefit from cheating (due to higher profits) has to be greater than the intrinsic loss a manager suffers (due to
quantity degradation). In what follows we assume that this is always true.
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This is further illuminated by inspecting (ICM): the term that is subtracted from the right-hand
side captures how heavily the loss of quantity – due to cheating – is discounted. The role that
mission heterogeneity plays in the model now becomes clear: if cheating did not affect quantity
then this term would be zero so the right-hand side of the inequality would be the same across
firm types, and no organizational form would find it easier to attract volunteers. But to the
extent that volunteering does affect the quantity of the service provided, the term is positive, so
nonprofit incorporation relaxes the incentive compatibility condition that makes commitment to
hiring volunteers credible. This suggests that volunteer hiring by nonprofits should occur only in
fields where matching on mission heterogeneity has a noticeable effect on quantity.
Proposition 2 has the following important implication.
Corollary 1 For-profit firms will not be able to participate in a volunteer hiring structure that is
just incentive compatible for nonprofit firms.
Free entry in the mission sector will ensure that the incentive compatibility condition of the
nonprofit firm (ICM) binds. However, when this is the case, incentive compatibility for for-
profit firms will be violated which means that they cannot credibly commit to hiring volunteers.
Furthermore, if a mission-motivated manager were to enter the mission sector establishing a for-
profit firm and implement an internship structure she would be outcompeted by existing not-for-
profit firms recruiting volunteers because of their lower labor costs. Thus, incorporation as nonprofit
is valuable for managers because it serves as a commitment device that signals potential volunteers
that they will be fairly treated. The very factor that is usually thought of as accounting for the
efficiency supremacy of for-profit governance – high-powered incentives – can rule out participation
in the volunteering incentive structure in mission-oriented sectors.
The model’s prediction that only nonprofit firms will participate in a volunteering structure and
that this will occur in mission-related activities is consistent with even a casual observation of the
pattern of sectoral distribution of volunteer activity, according to which nonprofit agencies are the
overwhelming recipients of volunteering services. This is even true in mixed ownership industries
(childcare, nursing homes etc) where for-profits coexist and compete against nonprofits in both the
output and labor markets.
For a different perspective on the difficulties associated with sustaining the volunteer-hiring
structure notice that, because incentives are sector-wide and not employer-specific, their provision
has the character of a public good and is susceptible to a form of free-riding. That is, each individual
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employer would like to obtain labor donations from volunteers but refrain from reciprocating by
subsequently hiring them into paid positions, thereby free-riding on other organizations’ hiring of
volunteers. When the free riding is severe – i.e. when condition (13) fails – it leads to the unraveling
of the volunteering structure. The implication of Proposition 2 is that organizing the production
of mission goods by nonprofit organizations is a less costly way to overcome this kind of free-riding
problem.
6 Conclusion
This paper helps us understand a number of related observations regarding volunteer activity
and the sectoral concentration of nonprofit firms. By committing not to distribute surpluses, the
nonprofit status ensures that the social mission takes precedence over the financial remuneration
of any interested parties. This paper shows that this commitment allows nonprofit firms alone to
sustain a sector-wide incentive structure – volunteer hiring – which is capable of initially extracting
labor donations from volunteers and subsequently compensates them with higher wages as they
transition to paid positions.
In addition, I argued that volunteering facilitates the matching of workers and organizations
with similar mission preferences. The tighter congruence of organizations’ and workers’ goals in
nonprofit organizations offers them a competitive advantage in mission-oriented sectors. In the non-
mission oriented sector of the economy there is no scope for nonprofit organizations to be founded
since the for-profit structure is preferable in that it allows the manager/owner to fully appropriate
profits, whereas the nonprofit status rules out this possibility. Consequently, the simple framework
developed here explains endogenously the observed dichotomy that the mission-oriented sector is
associated with nonprofit organizations, which hire volunteers and sort them into paid positions
based on their intrinsic preferences, whereas the non-mission sector is occupied by profit taking
firms which hire interns.
The model presented here takes a stylized approach to modeling volunteer hiring focusing on
incentive provision (rent extraction) and matching, since my main objective has been to provide
a rationale for the fact that nonprofit organizations can exclusively tap into the pool of volunteer
workers. I have left out of the analysis the possibility that volunteering may also act as a signal
of workers’ type as well as an investment in human capital, which are interesting perspectives that
can generate additional insights into the workings of the volunteer labor market. Incorporation of
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such considerations into the current framework is left for future work.
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A Appendix A: Equilibrium Strategies Supporting the Relational
Contracts.
A.1 Information Sets
Let hwi (t) denote worker i
′s public history up to time t, with hwi (t) = 1 if the worker has not been
involved in a separation due to cheating, and hwi (t) = 0, otherwise. Similarly, a manager j
′s public
history is denoted hmj (t), with h
m
j (t) = 1 if the manager has not been involved in a separation due
to cheating, and hmj (t) = 0, otherwise. Let qi(t) denote worker i
′s effort contribution up to time t,
with qi(t) = 1 if the worker has delivered promised effort and qi(t) = 0, otherwise. Also, let fj(t)
denote whether manager j has honoured all previous promises made to workers, with fj(t) = 1 if
she has and fj(t) = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, if worker i has provided promised effort when working for j or has shirked but
has not been caught (an event which occurs with probability 1 − µ) then let qij(t) = 1, whereas
if the worker has been caught shirking (an event which occurs with probability µ) it is qij(t) = 0.
Similarly, let fij(t) denote whether manager j has honoured all previous promises made to worker
i, with fij(t) = 1 if all promises were honoured and fij(t) = 0, otherwise.
Agents know all previous wage payments made since this is verifiable information. Let H(t) =
{w0, w1, ...wt−1} denote the history of wage payments made up to time t.
Let W denote the set of all workers andM the set of all managers, then worker i′s information
set in period t, is given by the collection of the public histories of all workers and managers up to
time t − 1, hW(t − 1)∪ hM(t − 1) ∪ H(t − 1), as well as the private information he has from his
own employment history qi(t − 1) and his interactions with employers ∪
j∈Mi
fij(t − 1), where Mi
is the set of managers for whom worker i has worked. Similarly, manager j′s information set in
period t comprises the collection of the public histories of all workers and managers up to time
t − 1, hW(t − 1)∪ hM(t − 1) ∪H(t − 1), as well as the private information she has from her own
history as employer fj(t− 1) and her interactions with her workers ∪
i∈Wj
qij(t− 1), where Wj is the
set of workers that manager j has employed.
A.2 Strategy Space
Strategies consist of rules that specify a worker’s and a manager’s set of actions at each information
set and time t.
29
• Worker: A strategy σw(t) for the worker specifies two sorts of actions. First, it specifies
whether to accept an employment offer (volunteering or internship) from every manager. An
offer consists of an unpaid position along with a promise of promotion to a wage position
(within the organization in the case of an internship, in an organization of matching type
in the case of volunteering), when a vacancy is created, as well as a wage offer (w). In the
second stage, for a worker who has accepted the offer from a given employer, and is either in
the unpaid or the paid position, the strategy specifies whether to provide high effort (qi = 1)
or not (qi = 0) and whether to continue in the employment relationship or quit.
• Manager: A strategy σm(t) for a manager specifies the following set of actions. Firstly, it
specifies what type of employment offer to make to workers: volunteering or internship, and
the accompanying wages. Secondly, if a volunteering structure is implemented, it specifies
whether to honour the promise to promote a worker from the pool of volunteers when a paid
position opening has occurred (fj = 1) or to renege on the promise (fj = 0) by filling the
vacancy with an intern hired from the general pool. Finally, it specifies whether to continue
an employment relationship or not.
A.3 Equilibrium Strategies Supporting the Volunteering Structure







the volunteering structure prescribe in every possible information set.
Worker’s strategy σ∗wi (t):
1. If manager j′s incentive compatibility constraint, as defined in (13), is satisfied, and hmj (t−
1) = 1 and hwi (t − 1) = 1, and qi(t − 1)fij(t − 1) = 1, then accept a volunteering position
promising promotion to a wage position of wV , satisfying (ICV ), and set qij = 1. Otherwise,
do not accept a volunteering position. If the worker is already in a paid position then accept
any wage offer. If hmj (t − 1) = 1 and hwi (t − 1) = 1, and qi(t − 1)fij(t − 1) = 1, and the
up-front wage wV satisfies (ICV ), then set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
2. If hwi (t−1) = 1, and qi(t−1)fij(t−1) = 1, then accept an internship position in organization
j promising a wage of wI , satisfying (ICI), and set qij = 1. Otherwise, do not accept an
internship position. If the worker is already in a paid position then accept any wage offer. If
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hwi (t− 1) = 1, and qi(t− 1)fij(t− 1) = 1, and the up-front wage offer wI satisfies (ICI), then
set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
3. Terminate a relationship with a manager if promised promotion or promised wage offer have
not been met.
Manager’s strategy σ∗mj (t):
1. If the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (13) is satisfied, and hmj (t − 1) = 1 and
hwi (t− 1) = 1, and qij(t− 1)fj(t− 1) = 1, then: a) Offer worker i a volunteering position. b)
Honour the promise to promote a worker i from the volunteer pool into a paid position (fj = 1)
whether i has volunteered for j or not, when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If a worker i is
an existing paid worker with hmj (t−1) = 1 and hwi (t−1) = 1, and qi(t−1)fij(t−1) = 1, who
has received previous payment of w ≥ wV , make him an up-front wage offer of wV satisfying
(ICV ).
2. If the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (13) is satisfied, and hmj (t − 1) = 0 and
hwi (t − 1) = 1, and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 1, then: a) Offer worker i an internship position.
b) Honour the promise to promote a worker i who has interned for you into a paid position
(fj = 1), when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If a worker i is an existing paid worker with
an internship history with you and hmj (t−1) = 1 and hwi (t−1) = 1, and qij(t−1)fj(t−1) = 1,
then make him an up-front wage offer of wI .
3. If (13) is satisfied, and hmj (t − 1) = 1, hwi (t − 1) = 1 and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 0, then make
no offer to worker i.
4. If (13) is satisfied, and hmj (t− 1) = 1 and hwi (t− 1) = 0, then make no offer to worker i.
5. If (13) is violated, and hmj (t − 1) = 0, hwi (t − 1) = 1 and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 1, then: a)
Offer worker i an internship position b) Honour the promise to promote worker i into a paid
position (fj = 1), when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If worker i is an existing paid worker
with an internship history and hwi (t− 1) = 1, and qij(t− 1)fj(t− 1) = 1, then make worker i
a wage offer of wI .
6. If (13) is violated, and either hmj (t− 1) = 0, or hwi (t− 1) = 1, or qij(t− 1)fj(t− 1) = 1 does
not hold, then make no offer to worker i.
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The above strategies induce a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, in which managers
choose to set up a volunteering structure. Workers accept volunteering positions with a promise
of promotion to a paid position paying wV and choose not to shirk, while managers honour their
promises to promote only workers with volunteering experience and rehire workers who have pro-
vided the promised effort. Note that the above strategies describe behavior both on and off the
equilibrium path, for instance, after one of the parties reneges on a promise. To see this, note
that under the equilibrium strategy σ∗mi (t) a manager who has cheated on a promise to promote
volunteers and has therefore lost reputation, will continue to exploit future volunteers, and this
would be a best response to workers’ equilibrium strategy σ∗wi (t) of not accepting volunteer posi-
tions in organizations with stained reputations. In turn, a worker’s best response facing a manager
who has lost reputation is to only accept internship positions paying wI > wV , which is what
the equilibrium strategy σ∗wi (t) prescribes. Also, this is the best the manager can do since under
σ∗wi (t) workers offered a lower up-front wage will shirk. Or suppose that a worker shirks. Then
the equilibrium strategy of the manager states that the worker should not be hired again. This is
optimal given that the worker’s equilibrium strategy says that a shirking worker will shirk again
even if the wage offer is wV . Furthermore, this is the optimal thing for the worker to do, since the
equilibrium strategy of the manager calls for a shirking worker not to be hired again.






1. If manager j′s incentive compatibility constraint, as defined in (11) below, is satisfied, and
hmj (t−1) = 1 and hwi (t−1) = 1, and qi(t−1)fij(t−1) = 1, then accept an internship position
promising promotion to a wage position of wI , satisfying (ICI), and set qij = 1. Otherwise,
do not accept an internship position. If the worker is already in a paid position then accept
any wage offer. If hmj (t − 1) = 1 and hwi (t − 1) = 1, and qi(t − 1)fij(t − 1) = 1, and the
up-front wage wI satisfies (ICI), then set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
2. Accept any non-negative up-front wage offer. If hwi (t−1) = 1, and qi(t−1)fij(t−1) = 1, and
the up-front wage offer satisfies wI satisfies (ICI), then set qij = 1, otherwise set qij = 0.
3. Terminate a relationship with an organization if promised promotion or promised wage offer







1. If the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (11) is satisfied, and hmj (t − 1) = 1 and
hwi (t − 1) = 1, and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 1, then: a) Offer worker i an internship position.
b) Honour the promise to promote a worker i who has interned for you into a paid position
(fj = 1), when there is a paid work vacancy. c) If a worker i is an existing paid worker with
an internship history with you and hmj (t−1) = 1 and hwi (t−1) = 1, and qij(t−1)fj(t−1) = 1,
then make him an up-front wage offer of wI .
2. If the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (11) is satisfied, and hmj (t − 1) = 0 and
hwi (t − 1) = 1, and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 1, then offer an up-front wage offer wI satisfying
(ICI).
3. If (11) is satisfied, and hmj (t − 1) = 1, hwi (t − 1) = 1 and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 0, then make
no offer to worker i.
4. If (11) is satisfied, and hmj (t− 1) = 1 and hwi (t− 1) = 0, then make no offer to worker i.
5. If (11) is violated, and hmj (t − 1) = 0, hwi (t − 1) = 1 and qij(t − 1)fj(t − 1) = 1, then make
worker i a wage offer of wI .
6. If (11) is violated, and either hmj (t− 1) = 0, or hwi (t− 1) = 1, or qij(t− 1)fj(t− 1) = 1 does
not hold, then make no offer to worker i.
The above strategies give rise to a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, in which workers
accept internship positions with a promise of promotion to a paid position paying wI and choose
not to shirk, while managers honour their promises to promote interns into paid positions and
rehire workers who have provided the promised effort.
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B Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: It is
V gi =
−
w + β[ρV Iij + (1− ρ)V gi ]
⇒ V gi =
−
w + βρV Iij
1− β(1− ρ) (B-1)
and
V Iij = −eh + β
[
(1− β)V pij + βV Iij
]
⇒ V Iij =
−eh + β(1− β)V pij
1− β2 (B-2)
while
V pij = w
I + θij − eh + βV pij
⇒ V pij =
wI + θij − eh
1− β (B-3)
and
V sij = w
I + θij + β
[
µV g + (1− µ)V sij
]
⇒ V sij =
wI + θij + βµV
g
1− β(1− µ)
So, incentive compatibility implies:
V pij ≥ V sij =
wI + θij + βµV
g
1− β(1− µ) =
wI + θij
1− β(1− µ) +
βµ
1− β(1− µ)









(1− β(1− µ)) (1− β(1− ρ)) +
β2µρ
(1− β(1− µ)) (1− β(1− ρ))
(
−eh + β(1− β)V pij
1− β2
)
Substituting from (B-3) and rearranging yields the incentive compatible wage in (ICI).
Also note that straightforward computation yields: ∂w
I(ρ)





positive under the condition stated in the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 2: An assortatively matched pair generates strictly more surplus than one where
types differ. When workers’ type matches the type of the organization, provision of the mission
good (gm) is enhanced (gm = ĝm > g
h
m). Consider a matching-equilibrium without assortatively
matched pairs. An organization employing a worker of a different type would have an incentive to
attract a worker of the same type by offering him some share of the higher surplus. This would
also be preferred by the worker thus undoing the stability of the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3: Similar to that of Lemma 1, so omitted.
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